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Abstract
An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation
of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems
concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively separable
hedonic games. First, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a contrac-
tually individually stable partition. This contrasts with previous results such as the
NP-hardness of computing individually stable or Nash stable partitions. Secondly,
we prove that checking whether the core or the strict core exists is NP-hard in the
strong sense even if the preferences of the players are symmetric. Finally, it is shown
that verifying whether a partition consisting of the grand coalition is contractually
strict core stable or Pareto optimal is coNP-complete.
1 Introduction
Ever since the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior in 1944, coalitions have played a central role within game theory. The
crucial questions in coalitional game theory are which coalitions can be expected to form
and how the members of coalitions should divide the proceeds of their cooperation. Tradi-
tionally the focus has been on the latter issue, which led to the formulation and analysis of
concepts such as the core, the Shapley value, or the bargaining set. Which coalitions are
likely to form is commonly assumed to be settled exogenously, either by explicitly specifying
the coalition structure, a partition of the players in disjoint coalitions, or, implicitly, by as-
suming that larger coalitions can invariably guarantee better outcomes to its members than
smaller ones and that, as a consequence, the grand coalition of all players will eventually
form. The two questions, however, are clearly interdependent: the individual players’ pay-
offs depend on the coalitions that form just as much as the formation of coalitions depends
on how the payoffs are distributed.
Coalition formation games, as introduced by Dre`ze and Greenberg (1980), provide a
simple but versatile formal model that allows one to focus on coalition formation. In
many situations it is natural to assume that a player’s appreciation of a coalition struc-
ture only depends on the coalition he is a member of and not on how the remaining
players are grouped. Initiated by Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002), much of the work on coalition formation now concentrates on these so-called he-
donic games. Hedonic games are relevant in modeling many settings such as formation of
groups, clubs and societies (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002) and also online social network-
ing (Elkind and Wooldridge, 2009).
The main focus in hedonic games has been on notions of stability for coalition structures
such as Nash stability, individual stability, contractual individual stability, or core stabil-
ity and characterizing conditions under which the set of stable partitions is guaranteed
to be non-empty (see, e.g., Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002; Burani and Zwicker, 2003).
Sung and Dimitrov (2007b) presented a taxonomy of stability concepts which includes the
1This material is based on work supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under grants BR-
2312/6-1 (within the European Science Foundation’s EUROCORES program LogICCC) and BR 2312/7-1.
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contractual strict core, the most general stability concept that is guaranteed to exist. A well-
studied special case of hedonic games are two-sided matching games in which only coalitions
of size two are admissible (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). We refer to Hajdukova´ (2006) for
a critical overview of hedonic games.
Hedonic games have recently been examined from an algorithmic perspective (see, e.g.,
Ballester, 2004; Dimitrov et al., 2006). Cechla´rova´ (2008) surveyed the algorithmic problems
related to stable partitions in hedonic games in various representations. Ballester (2004)
showed that for hedonic games represented by individually rational list of coalitions, the
complexity of checking whether core stable, Nash stable, or individual stable partitions exist
is NP-complete. He also proved that every hedonic game admits a contractually individually
stable partition. Coalition formation games have also received attention in the artificial
intelligence community where the focus has generally been on computing optimal partitions
for general coalition formation games Sandholm et al. (1999) without any combinatorial
structure. Elkind and Wooldridge (2009) proposed a fully-expressive model to represent
hedonic games which encapsulates well-known representations such as individually rational
list of coalitions and additive separability.
Additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs) constitute a particularly natural and suc-
cinctly representable class of hedonic games. Each player in an ASHG has a value for any
other player and the value of a coalition to a particular player is simply the sum of the
values he assigns to the members of his coalition. Additive separability satisfies a number of
desirable axiomatic properties (Barbera` et al., 2004) and ASHGs are the non-transferable
utility generalization of graph games studied by Deng and Papadimitriou (1994). Olsen
(2009) showed that checking whether a nontrivial Nash stable partition exists in an ASHG
is NP-complete if preferences are nonnegative and symmetric. This result was improved
by Sung and Dimitrov (2010) who showed that checking whether a core stable, strict core
stable, Nash stable, or individually stable partition exists in a general ASHG is NP-hard.
Dimitrov et al. (2006) obtained positive algorithmic results for subclasses of ASHGs in which
each player merely divides other players into friends and enemies. Branzei and Larson
(2009) examined the tradeoff between stability and social welfare in ASHGs. Recently,
Gairing and Savani (2010) showed that computing partitions that satisfy some variants of
individual-based stability is PLS-complete, even for very restricted preferences. In another
paper, Aziz et al. (2010) studied the complexity of computing and verifying optimal parti-
tions in ASHGs.
In this paper, we settle the complexity of key problems regarding stable partitions of
ASHGs. We present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a contractually individually
stable partition. This is the first positive algorithmic result (with respect to one of the stan-
dard stability concepts put forward by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)) for general ASHGs
with no restrictions on the preferences. We strengthen recent results of Sung and Dimitrov
(2010) and prove that checking whether the core or the strict core exists is NP-hard, even
if the preferences of the players are symmetric. Finally, it is shown that verifying whether a
partition is in the contractually strict core (CSC) is coNP-complete, even if the partition un-
der question consists of the grand coalition. This is the first computational hardness result
concerning CSC stability in hedonic games of any representation. The proof can be used to
show that verifying whether the partition consisting of the grand coalition is Pareto opti-
mal is coNP-complete, thereby answering a question mentioned by Aziz et al. (2010). Our
computational hardness results imply computational hardness of the equivalent questions
for hedonic coalition nets (Elkind and Wooldridge, 2009).
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the terminology and notation required for our results.
A hedonic coalition formation game is a pair (N,P) where N is a set of players and P
is a preference profile which specifies for each player i ∈ N the preference relation %i, a
reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation on the set Ni = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S}. The
statement S ≻i T denotes that i strictly prefers S over T whereas S ∼i T means that i is
indifferent between coalitions S and T . A partition pi is a partition of players N into disjoint
coalitions. By pi(i), we denote the coalition of pi that includes player i.
We consider utility-based models rather than purely ordinal models. In additively sepa-
rable preferences, a player i gets value vi(j) for player j being in the same coalition as i and
if i is in coalition S ∈ Ni, then i gets utility
∑
j∈S\{i} vi(j). A game (N,P) is additively
separable if for each player i ∈ N , there is a utility function vi : N → R such that vi(i) = 0
and for coalitions S, T ∈ Ni, S %i T if and only if
∑
j∈S vi(j) ≥
∑
j∈T vi(j). We will denote
the utility of player i in partition pi by upi(i).
A preference profile is symmetric if vi(j) = vj(i) for any two players i, j ∈ N and is
strict if vi(j) 6= 0 for all i, j ∈ N . For any player i, let F (i, A) = {j ∈ A | vi(j) > 0} be the
set of friends of player i within A.
We now define important stability concepts used in the context of coalition formation
games.
• A partition is Nash stable (NS) if no player can benefit by moving from his coalition
S to another (possibly empty) coalition T .
• A partition is individually stable (IS) if no player can benefit by moving from his
coalition S to another existing (possibly empty) coalition T while not making the
members of T worse off.
• A partition is contractually individually stable (CIS) if no player can benefit by moving
from his coalition S to another existing (possibly empty) coalition T while making
neither the members of S nor the members of T worse off.
• We say that a coalition S ⊆ N strongly blocks a partition pi, if each player i ∈ S
strictly prefers S to his current coalition pi(i) in the partition pi. A partition which
admits no blocking coalition is said to be in the core (C).
• We say that a coalition S ⊆ N weakly blocks a partition pi, if each player i ∈ S weakly
prefers S to pi(i) and there exists at least one player j ∈ S who strictly prefers S to
his current coalition pi(j). A partition which admits no weakly blocking coalition is in
the strict core (SC).
• A partition pi is in the contractual strict core (CSC) if any weakly blocking coalition
S makes at least one player j ∈ N \ S worse off when breaking off.
The inclusion relationships between stability concepts depicted in Figure 1 follow from
the definitions of the concepts. We will also consider Pareto optimality. A partition pi of N
is Pareto optimal if there exists no partition pi′ of N such that for all i ∈ N , pi′(i) %i pi(i)
and there exists at least one player j ∈ N such that pi′(j) ≻j pi(j). We say that a partition
pi satisfies individual rationality if each player does as well as by being alone, i.e., for all
i ∈ N , pi(i) %i {i}.
Throughout the paper, we assume familiarity with basic concepts of computational com-
plexity (see, e.g., Arora and Barak, 2009).
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Figure 1: Inclusion relationships between stability concepts. For example, every Nash stable
partition is also individually stable.
3 Contractual individual stability
It is known that computing or even checking the existence of Nash stable or individually
stable partitions in an ASHG is NP-hard. On the other hand, a potential function argument
can be used to show that at least one CIS partition exists for every hedonic game (Ballester,
2004). The potential function argument does not imply that a CIS partition can be com-
puted in polynomial time. There are many cases in hedonic games, where a solution is
guaranteed to exist but computing it is not feasible. For example, Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002) presented a potential function argument for the existence of a Nash stable parti-
tion for ASHGs with symmetric preferences. However there are no known polynomial-time
algorithms to compute such partitions and there is evidence that there may not be any
polynomial-time algorithm (Gairing and Savani, 2010). In this section, we show that a CIS
partition can be computed in polynomial time for ASHGs. The algorithm is formally de-
scribed as Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 may also prove useful as a preprocessing or intermediate
routine in other algorithms to compute different types of stable partitions of hedonic games.
Theorem 1. A CIS partition can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Our algorithm to compute a CIS partition can be viewed as successively giving a
priority token to players to form the best possible coalition among the remaining players or
join the best possible coalition which tolerates the player. The basic idea of the algorithm is
described informally as follows. Set variable R to N and consider an arbitrary player a ∈ R.
Call a the leader of the first coalition Si with i = 1. Move any player j such that va(j) > 0
from R to Si. Such players are called the leader’s helpers. Then keep moving any player
from R to Si which is tolerated by all players in Si and strictly liked by at least one player
in Si. Call such players needed players. Now increment i and take another player a from
among the remaining players R and check the maximum utility he can get from among R.
If this utility is less than the utility which can be obtained by joining a previously formed
coalition in {S1, . . . , Si−1}, then send the player to such a coalition where he can get the
maximum utility (as long all players in the coalition tolerate the incoming player). Such
players are called latecomers. Otherwise, form a new coalition Si around a which is the best
possible coalition for player a taking only players from the remaining players R. Repeat the
process until all players have been dealt with and R = ∅. We prove by induction on the
number of coalitions formed that no CIS deviation can occur in the resulting partition. The
hypothesis is the following:
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Algorithm 1 CIS partition of an ASHG
Input: additively separable hedonic game (N,P).
Output: CIS partition.
i← 0
R← N
while R 6= ∅ do
Take any player a ∈ R
h←
∑
b∈F (a,R) va(b)
z ← i+ 1
for k ← 1 to i do
h′ ←
∑
b∈Sk
va(b)
if (h < h′) ∧ (∀b ∈ Sk, vb(a) = 0) then
h← h′
z ← k
end if
end for
if z 6= i+ 1 then // a is latecomer
Sz ← {a} ∪ Sz
R← R \ {a}
else // a is leader
i← z
Si ← {a}
Si ← Si ∪ F (a,R) // add leader’s helpers
R← R \ Si
end if
while ∃j ∈ R such that ∀i ∈ Sz, vi(j) ≥ 0 and ∃i ∈ Sz, vi(j) > 0 do
R← R \ {j}
Sz ← Sz ∪ {j} // add needed players
end while
end while
return {S1, . . . , Si}
Consider the kth first formed coalitions S1, . . . , Sk. Then neither of the following can
happen:
1. There is a CIS deviation by a player from among S1, . . . , Sk.
2. There is a CIS deviation by a player from among N \
⋃
i∈{1,...,k} Si to a coalition in
{S1, . . . , Sk}.
Base case Consider the coalition S1. Then the leader of S1 has no incentive to leave.
The leader’s helpers are not allowed to leave by the leader. If they did, the leader’s utility
would decrease. For each of the needed players, there exists one player in S1 who does not
allow the needed player to leave. Now let us assume a latecomer i arrives in S1. This is only
possible if the maximum utility that the latecomer can derive from a coalition C ⊆ (N \S1)
is less than
∑
j∈S1
vi(j). Therefore once i joins S1, he will only become less happy by leaving
S1.
Any player i ∈ N \S1 cannot have a CIS deviation to S1. Either i is disliked by at least
one player in S1 or i is disliked by no player in S1. In the first case, i cannot deviate to
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S1 even he has an incentive to. In the second case, player i has no incentive to move to S1
because if he had an incentive, he would already have moved to S1 as a latecomer.
Induction step Assume that the hypothesis is true. Then we prove that the same holds
for the formed coalitions S1, . . . , Sk, Sk+1. By the hypothesis, we know that players cannot
leave coalitions S1, . . . , Sk. Now consider Sk+1. The leader a of Sk+1 is either not allowed
to join one of the coalitions in {S1, . . . , Sk} or if he is, he has no incentive to join it. Player
a would already have been member of Si for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} if one of the following was
true:
• There is some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that the leader of Si likes a.
• There is some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that for all b ∈ Si, vb(a) ≥ 0 and there exists b ∈ Si
such that vb(a) > 0.
• There is some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that for all b ∈ Si, vb(a) = 0 and
∑
b∈Si
va(b) >∑
b∈F (i,N\∪k
i=1
Si)
va(b) and
∑
b∈Si
va(b) ≥
∑
b∈Sj
va(b) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Therefore a has no incentive or is not allowed to move to another Sj for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Also a will have no incentive to move to any coalition formed after S1, . . . , Sk+1 because he
can do strictly better in Sk+1. Similarly, a’s helpers are not allowed to leave Sk+1 even if
they have an incentive to. Their movement out of Sk+1 will cause a to become less happy.
Also each needed player in Sk+1 is not allowed to leave because at least one player in Sk
likes him. Now consider a latecomer l in Sk+1. Latecomer l gets strictly less utility in any
coalition C ⊆ N \
⋃k+1
i=1 Si. Therefore l has no incentive to leave Sk+1.
Finally, we prove that there exists no player x ∈ N \
⋃k+1
j=1 Si such that x has an incentive
to and is allowed to join Si for i ∈ {1, . . . k + 1}. By the hypothesis, we already know that
x does not have an incentive or is allowed to a join a coalition Si for i ∈ {1, . . . k}. Since x
is not a latecomer for Sk+1, x either does not have an incentive to join Sk+1 or is disliked
by at least one player in Sk+1.
4 Core and strict core
For ASHGs, the problem of testing the core membership of a partition is coNP-
complete (Sung and Dimitrov, 2007a). This fact does not imply that checking the existence
of a core stable partition is NP-hard. Recently, Sung and Dimitrov (2010) showed that for
ASHGs checking whether a core stable or strict core stable partition exists is NP-hard in
the strong sense. Their reduction relied on the asymmetry of the players’ preferences. We
prove that even with symmetric preferences, checking whether a core stable or a strict core
stable partition exists is NP-hard in the strong sense. Symmetry is a natural, but rather
strong condition, that can often be exploited algorithmically.
We first present an example of a six-player ASHG with symmetric preferences for which
the core (and thereby the strict core) is empty.
Example 1. Consider a six player symmetric ASHG adapted from an example by
Banerjee et al. (2001) where
• v1(2) = v3(4) = v5(6) = 6;
• v1(6) = v2(3) = v4(5) = 5;
• v1(3) = v3(5) = v1(5) = 4;
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of Example 1. All edges not shown in the figure have
weight −33.
• v1(4) = v2(5) = v3(6) = −33; and
• v2(4) = v2(6) = v4(6) = −33
as depicted in Figure 2.
It can be checked that no partition is core stable for the game. Note that if vi(j) = −33,
then i and j cannot be in the same coalition of a core stable partition. Also, players can
do better than in a partition of singleton players. Let coalitions which satisfy individual
rationality be called feasible coalitions. We note that the following are the feasible coalitions:
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 5}, {1, 6}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {3, 4, 5}, {3, 5}, {4, 5}
and {5, 6}.
Consider partition
pi = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6}}.
Then,
• upi(1) = 6;
• upi(2) = 6;
• upi(3) = 10;
• upi(4) = 11;
• upi(5) = 9; and
• upi(6) = 0.
Out of the feasible coalitions listed above, the only weakly (and also strongly) blocking
coalition is {1, 5, 6} in which player 1 gets utility 9, player 5 gets utility 10, and player 6 gets
utility 11. We note that the coalition {1, 2, 3} is not a weakly or strongly blocking coalition
because player 3 gets utility 9 in it. Similarly {1, 3, 5} is not a weakly or strongly blocking
coalition because both player 3 and player 5 are worse off. One way to prevent the deviation
{1, 5, 6} is to provide some incentive for player 6 not to deviate with 1 and 5. This idea will
be used in the proof of Theorem 2.
We now define a problem that is NP-complete is the strong sense:
Name: ExactCoverBy3Sets (E3C):
Instance: A pair (R,S), where R is a set and S is a collection of subsets of R such that
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of an ASHG derived from an instance of E3C in the
proof of Theorem 2. Symmetric utilities other than −33 are given as edges. Thick edges
indicate utility 10 14 and dashed edges indicate utility 1/2. Each hexagon at the top looks
like the one in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Graphical representation of the ASHG from Example 1 as used in the proof of
Theorem 2. All edges not shown in the figure have weight −33.
|R| = 3m for some positive integer m and |s| = 3 for each s ∈ S.
Question: Is there a sub-collection S′ ⊆ S which is a partition of R?
It is known that E3C remains NP-complete even if each r ∈ R occurs in at most three
members of S (Sung and Dimitrov, 2010). We will use this assumption in the proof of
Theorem 2, which will be shown by a reduction from E3C.
Theorem 2. Checking whether a core stable or a strict core stable partition exists is NP-
hard in the strong sense, even when preferences are symmetric.
Proof. Let (R,S) be an instance of E3C where r ∈ R occurs in at most three members of
S. We reduce (R,S) to an ASHGs with symmetric preferences (N,P) in which there is a
player ys corresponding to each s ∈ S and there are six players xr1, . . . , x
r
6 corresponding
to each r ∈ R. These players have preferences over each other in exactly the way players
1, . . . , 6 have preference over each other as in Example 1.
So, N = {xr1, . . . , x
r
6 | r ∈ R} ∪ {y
s | s ∈ S}. We assume that all preferences are
symmetric. The player preferences are as follows:
• For i ∈ R,
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vxi
1
(xi2) = vxi
3
(xi4) = vxi
5
(xi6) = 6;
vxi
1
(xi6) = vxi
2
(xi3) = vxi
4
(xi5) = 5; and
vxi
1
(xi3) = vxi
3
(xi5) = vxi
1
(xi5) = 4;
• For any s = {k, l,m} ∈ S,
vxk
6
(xl6) = vxl
6
(xk6) = vxk
6
(xm6 ) = vxm6 (x
k
6) = vxl
6
(xm6 ) = vxm6 (x
l
6) = 1/2; and
vxk
6
(ys) = vxl
6
(ys) = vxm
6
(ys) = 10 14 ;
• vi(j) = −33 for any i, j ∈ N for valuations not defined above.
We prove that (N,P ) has a non-empty strict core (and thereby core) if and only if there
exists an S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is a partition of R.
Assume that there exists an S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is a partition of R. Then we prove that
there exists a strict core stable (and thereby core stable) partition pi where pi is defined as
follows:
{{xi1, x
i
2}, {x
i
3, x
i
4, x
i
5} | i ∈ R} ∪ {{y
s} | s ∈ S \ S′}
∪ {{ys ∪ {xi6 | i ∈ s}} | s ∈ S
′}.
For all i ∈ R,
• upi(xi1) = 6;
• upi(x
i
2) = 6;
• upi(xi3) = 10;
• upi(xi4) = 11;
• upi(xi5) = 9; and
• upi(xi6) = 1/2 + 1/2 + 10
1
4 = 11
1
4 > 11.
Also upi(y
s) = 3 × (10 14 ) = 30
3
4 for all s ∈ S
′ and upi(y
s) = 0 for all s ∈ S \ S′. We
see that for each player, his utility is non-negative. Therefore there is no incentive for
any player to deviate and form a singleton coalition. From Example 1 we also know that
the only possible strongly blocking (and weakly blocking) coalition is {xi1 x
i
5, x
i
6} for any
i ∈ R. However, xi6 has no incentive to be part {x
i
1, x
i
5, x
i
6} because upi(x
i
6) = 11 and
vxi
6
(xi5)+vxi
6
(xi1) = 6+5 = 11. Also x
i
1 and x
i
5 have no incentive to join pi(x
i
6) because their
new utility will become negative because of the presence of the ys player. Assume for the
sake of contradiction that pi is not core stable and xi6 can deviate with a lot of x
j
6s. But, x
i
6
can only deviate with a maximum of six other players of type xj6 because i ∈ R is present
in a maximum of three elements in S. In this case xi6 gets a maximum utility of only 1.
Therefore pi is in the strict core (and thereby the core).
We now assume that there exists a partition which is core stable. Then we prove that
there exists an S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is a partition of R. For any s = {k, l,m} ∈ S, the
new utilities created due to the reduction gadget are only beneficial to ys, xk6 , x
l
6, and x
m
6 .
We already know that the only way the partition is core stable is if xi6 can be provided
disincentive to deviate with xi5 and x
i
1. The claim is that each x
i
6 needs to be in a coalition
with exactly one ys such that i ∈ s ∈ S and exactly two other players xj6 and x
k
6 such that
{i, j, k} = s ∈ S. We first show that xi6 needs to be with exactly one y
s such that i ∈ s ∈ S.
Player needs to be with at least one such ys. If xi6 is only with other x
j
6s, then we know
that xi6 gets a maximum utility of only 6× 1/2 = 3. Also, player x
i
6 cannot be in a coalition
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with ys and ys
′
such that i ∈ s and i ∈ s′ because both ys and ys
′
then get negative utility.
Each xi6 also needs to be with at least 2 other players x
j
6 and x
k
6 where j and k are also
members of s. If xi6 is with at least three players x
j
6, x
k
6 and x
k
6 , then there is one element
among a ∈ {j, k, l} such that a /∈ s. Therefore ys and xa6 hate each other and the coalition
{ys, xi6, x
j
6, x
k
6 , x
k
6} is not even individually rational. Therefore for the partition to be core
stable each xi6 has to be with exactly one y
s such that i ∈ s and and least 2 other players
xj6 and x
k
6 where j and k are also members of s. This implies that there exists an S
′ ⊆ S
such that S′ is a partition of R.
5 Contractual strict core and Pareto optimality
z1
zi
zk x1
x2 y2
y1
W/2
W/2
−W
W/2 W/2
−W
ai
ai
...
...
Figure 5: Graphical representation of the ASHG in the proof of Theorem 3. For all i ∈
{1, . . . , k}, an edge from x1 and x2 to zi has weight ai. All other edges not shown in the
figure have weight zero.
In this section, we prove that verifying whether a partition is CSC stable is coNP-
complete. Interestingly, coNP-completeness holds even if the partition in question consists
of the grand coalition. The proof of Theorem 3 is by a reduction from the following weakly
NP-complete problem.
Name: Partition
Instance: A set of k positive integer weights A = {a1, . . . , ak} such that
∑
ai∈A
ai = W .
Question: Is it possible to partition A, into two subsets A1 ⊆ A, A2 ⊆ A so that
A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ and A1 ∪A2 = A and
∑
ai∈A1
ai =
∑
ai∈A2
ai =W/2?
Theorem 3. Verifying whether the partition consisting of the grand coalition is CSC stable
is weakly coNP-complete.
Proof. The problem is clearly in coNP because a partition pi′ resulting by a CSC deviation
from {N} is a succinct certificate that {N} is not CSC stable. We prove NP-hardness of
deciding whether the grand coalition is not CSC stable by a reduction from Partition. We
can reduce an instance of I of Partition to an instance I ′ = ((N,P), pi) where (N,P) is
an ASHG defined in the following way:
• N = {x1, x2, y1, y2, z1, . . . , zk},
• vx1(y1) = vx1(y2) = vx2(y1) = vx2(y2) =W/2,
• vx1(zi) = vx2(zi) = ai, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
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• vx1(x2) = vx2(x1) = −W ,
• vy1(y2) = vy2(y1) = −W ,
• va(b) = 0 for any a, b ∈ N for which va(b) is not already defined, and
• pi = {N}.
We see that upi(x1) = upi(x1) = W , upi(y1) = upi(y2) = −W , upi(zi) = 0 for all i ∈
{1, . . . , k}. We show that pi is not CSC stable if and only if I is a ‘yes’ instance of Partition.
Assume I is a ‘yes’ instance of Partition and there exists an A1 ⊆ A such that
∑
ai∈A1
ai =
W/2. Then, form the following partition
pi′ = {{x1, y1} ∪ {zi | ai ∈ A1}, {x2, y2} ∪ {zi | ai ∈ N \A1}}
Then,
• upi′(x1) = upi′(x1) = W ;
• upi′(y1) = upi′(y2) = 0; and
• upi(zi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
The coalition C1 = {x1, y1}∪{zi | ai ∈ A1} can be considered as a coalition which leaves
the grand coalition so that all players in N do as well as before and at least one player in
C1, i.e., y1 gets strictly more utility. Also, the departure of C1 does not make any player in
N \ C1 worse off.
Assume that I is a ‘no’ instance of Partition and there exists no A1 ⊆ A such that∑
ai∈A1
ai =W/2. We show that no CSC deviation is possible from pi. We consider different
possibilities for a CSC blocking coalition C:
1. x1, x2, y1, y2 /∈ C,
2. x1, x2 /∈ C and there exists y ∈ {y1, y2} such that y ∈ C,
3. x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ C,
4. x1, x2 ∈ C and |C ∩ {y1, y2}| ≤ 1,
5. there exists x ∈ {x1, x2} and y ∈ {y1, y2} such that x, y ∈ C, {x1, x2} \ x * C, and
{y1, y2} \ y * C
We show that in each of the cases, C is a not a valid CSC blocking coalition.
1. If C is empty, then there exists no CSC blocking coalition. If C is not empty, then x1
and x2 gets strictly less utility when a subset of {z1, . . . , zk} deviates.
2. In this case, both x1 and x2 gets strictly less utility when y ∈ {y1, y2} leaves N .
3. If {z1, . . . , zk} ⊂ C, then there is no deviation as C = N . If there exists a zi ∈
{z1, . . . , zk} such that zi /∈ C, then x1 and x2 get strictly less utility than in N .
4. If |C ∩ {y1, y2}| = 0, then the utility of no player increases. If |C ∩ {y1, y2}| = 1, then
the utility of y1 and y2 increases but the utility of x1 and x2 decreases.
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5. Consider C = {x, y} ∪ S where S ⊆ {z1, . . . , zk}. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that x = x1 and y = y1. We know that y1 and y2 gets strictly more utility
because they are now in different coalitions. Since I is a ‘no’ instance of Partition,
we know that there exists no S such that
∑
a∈S vx1(a) = W/2. If
∑
a∈S vx1(a) > W/2,
then upi(x2) < W . If
∑
a∈S vx1(a) < W/2, then upi(x1) < W .
Thus, if I ′ is a ‘no’ instance of Partition, then there exists no CSC deviation.
From the proof of Theorem 3, it can be seen that pi is not Pareto optimal if and only if
I is a ‘yes’ instance of Partition.
Theorem 4. Verifying whether the partition consisting of the grand coalition is Pareto
optimal is coNP-complete.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
We presented a number of new computational results concerning stable partitions of ASHGs.
First, we proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a contractually individually
stable (CIS) partition. Secondly, we showed that checking whether the core or strict core
exists is NP-hard in the strong sense, even if the preferences of the players are symmet-
ric. Finally, we presented the first complexity result concerning the contractual strict core
(CSC), namely that verifying whether a partition is in the CSC is coNP-complete. We
saw that considering CSC deviations helps reason about the more complex Pareto optimal
improvements. As a result, we established that checking whether the partition consisting of
the grand coalition is Pareto optimal is also coNP-complete.
We note that Algorithm 1 may very well return a partition that fails to satisfy individual
rationality, i.e., players may get negative utility. It is an open question how to efficiently
compute a CIS partition that is guaranteed to satisfy individual rationality. We also note
that Theorem 3 may not imply anything about the complexity of computing a CSC partition.
Studying the complexity of computing a CSC stable partition is left as future work.
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